Tor in Russia: Roskomnadzor blocking and digital resistance since 2021

Published on April 17, 2026 · About 11 minutes read

On December 7, 2021, Roskomnadzor — Russia's federal telecommunications regulator — officially added torproject.org and all public Tor relays to the list of sites banned in Russia. Three months later, the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the "false information" laws that followed turned Russia into one of the most aggressive countries in terms of internet censorship. Paradoxically, Russia remains in 2026 one of the three largest Tor-using countries in the world, with between 800,000 and 1.4 million daily users. This coexistence — massive official blocking alongside massive daily use — is one of the most interesting situations to study in the contemporary anti-censorship ecosystem.

Timeline of blocking since 2017

Russia did not block Tor overnight. It was a gradual process of tightening over several years:

July 2017 — VPN law: requires VPN and proxy operators to apply the Roskomnadzor blocklist. Initially not strictly enforced.
March 2019 — "Runet" law (sovereign Russian internet): gives Roskomnadzor the tools to intervene directly in ISP network flows.
November 2020 — First partial Tor block in the Kaliningrad region (local test).
April 2021 — Opera and Yandex Browser remove the built-in VPN connection option to comply with authorities.
September 2021 — Block of many popular commercial VPNs in Russia (NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN partially).
December 7, 2021 — Official Tor block.

December 7, 2021: the official block

Roskomnadzor announced the block in a terse statement, citing that Tor "allows access to content whose distribution is prohibited in Russia". Technically, the block operates on two layers:

DNS blocking: torproject.org, bridges.torproject.org, and metrics.torproject.org no longer resolve from ordinary Russian DNS servers
IP blocking: the IP addresses of public Tor relays (openly listed by the Tor Project) are filtered at the border routers of Russian ISPs

The block has an immediate but limited effect: the number of Russian Tor users drops from roughly 300,000 to 100,000 within 48 hours. Then a gradual rebound as users switch to Snowflake and private bridges. Within two months, the figure returns to its pre-block level.

The effect of the war in Ukraine

The invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 triggers another massive crackdown. In March 2022:

Facebook shut down ("extremist activities" according to Roskomnadzor, Meta declared an "extremist organization")
Instagram shut down
Twitter / X blocked
Many independent Russian media outlets blocked (Meduza, Novaya Gazeta partially, Echo of Moscow)
Western media blocked (BBC, Deutsche Welle, Voice of America, RFE/RL)

Tor usage explodes immediately. March 2022 sees a historic peak with 2.1 million Russian daily users for several weeks. A gradual decline follows, stabilizing around 1 to 1.4 million.

The law of March 4, 2022 on "disinformation" criminalizes the "spreading of false information" about the Russian military with penalties of up to 15 years in prison. This law has considerably increased the risks for journalists, bloggers, and ordinary citizens who use Tor to share information about the war.

SORM: Russian-style surveillance

The SORM system (System for Operative Investigative Measures), created in 1995 and considerably modernized in 2018 (SORM-3), is the Russian equivalent of telecom surveillance tools. Every Russian ISP is required to connect its infrastructure to a SORM access point allowing authorities (primarily the FSB) to intercept any traffic upon judicial order.

SORM-3 includes DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) capabilities that can detect certain Tor traffic patterns. But unlike China's Great Firewall, which blocks automatically, SORM primarily operates in "targeted surveillance" mode: it observes and records rather than mass-blocking.

Since 2022, several reports (Citizen Lab, Filterwatch, Access Now) suggest a shift toward a more active blocking model — the Russian government is investing in Chinese DPI equipment (notably from Hikvision and Fibrehome) to reinforce SORM. The 2025–2026 trend is toward continuous tightening.

Working pluggable transports

Snowflake: the dominant transport

Since late 2021, Snowflake has been the most used transport in Russia. Its WebRTC architecture makes each connection unique and therefore difficult to blacklist. Experienced Russian users have actively participated in the Snowflake community by running voluntary proxies from abroad.

obfs4 with private bridges

obfs4 works as long as freshly obtained private bridges are used. Distribution via [email protected] and the Telegram bot remains functional. Some Russian ISPs attempt to detect obfs4 by its handshake pattern, but the transport has been updated several times to resist.

meek-azure: a niche option

Usable in Russia despite its slowness. Russian authorities are reluctant to block Azure entirely (which would break many business applications). Use case: users under intensive surveillance in extreme environments.

Zapret and GoodbyeDPI: local tools

A Russian peculiarity: the local technical community has developed powerful tools to defeat DPI at the network level rather than the application level. GoodbyeDPI (Windows) and Zapret (Linux, Android via root/NetGuard) modify TCP packet fragmentation in ways that desynchronize ISP DPI systems, which then no longer recognize the signatures of blocked sites.

These tools are not specific to Tor: they allow access to any blocked site without even using a VPN or proxy. They can be combined with Tor for double protection: Zapret to bypass the ISP layer, Tor for anonymity.

The source code is on GitHub (ValdikSS/GoodbyeDPI, bol-van/zapret) with very active communities. It has become a widely adopted parallel technical infrastructure among tech-savvy Russians.

Who uses Tor in Russia

Independent journalists in exile

Independent Russian media that fled in 2022 (Meduza in Riga, Novaya Gazeta Europe in Berlin and Paris, Echo of Moscow partially reconstituted in Vilnius) maintain .onion versions of their sites and communicate with their correspondents inside Russia via Tor.

Political opposition

The Alexei Navalny Foundation (before his death in February 2024) and opposition movements made heavy use of Tor to coordinate actions, distribute investigative videos, and protect their local teams. After 2024, successor movements (ACF, Kira Yarmysh) maintain this practice.

General public bypassing blocks

A significant proportion of Russian Tor users have no direct political motivation. They use Tor to access Instagram (massively blocked since 2022), Facebook, certain Western services (Netflix unavailable in Russia, Steam partially), and foreign media to diversify their news sources.

Ukrainian and Russian-speaking diaspora

Russians settled abroad (massive post-2022 emigration, estimated at 500,000 to 1 million people) use Tor to communicate with their families still in Russia through unsurveilled channels.

Legal risks

The Russian legal framework is evolving rapidly but has stable characteristics:

Using Tor is not illegal per se. No law directly criminalizes an end user's use of an anonymization tool.
Publishing banned content via Tor can lead to criminal charges: if the content falls under the 2022 laws on disinformation or extremism, penalties reach up to 15 years in prison.
Commercial VPN and proxy providers operating from Russia must apply the blocklist. Refusal can result in fines and closure.
Involuntary cooperation with intelligence services via SORM is mandatory for all ISPs and communications operators.

For ordinary Russian citizens, the practical risk of using Tor is limited. For journalists, activists, and opponents, the risk is real and can combine surveillance, arrest, and prosecution for published content. Many use Tor combined with Tails OS (see our guide) to minimize local traces.

Tor in Russia FAQ

Is Tor officially blocked in Russia?

Yes. On December 7, 2021, Roskomnadzor (Russia's telecommunications regulatory authority) officially added torproject.org and public Tor relays to Russia's list of blocked sites. The block technically targets the IP addresses of public relays and certain protocol signatures. Private bridges and Snowflake allow users to bypass this block.

Is using Tor illegal in Russia?

Not directly. Using Tor or a VPN is not criminalized as such under Russian law. The 2017 law on "circumvention tools" prohibits VPN operators from refusing to apply the blocklist, but does not prosecute end users. However, content accessed via Tor (foreign media, banned social networks) may lead to prosecution under the 2022 laws on "false information" concerning the military operation in Ukraine.

How many Russians use Tor despite the block?

According to Tor Project metrics, between 800,000 and 1.4 million Russian daily users in 2024–2026, making Russia one of the top three Tor-using countries in the world (alongside the United States and Germany). This high volume despite the official block reflects the technical maturity of the user base and the availability of pluggable transports.

Which pluggable transports work best in Russia?

Snowflake has been the most widely used since 2022, thanks to its DPI-resistant WebRTC architecture. obfs4 works with recent private bridges. meek-azure is available but slower. A Russian peculiarity: ISPs use sophisticated DPI (SORM-3), which can block certain traffic patterns — the Russian technical community has developed tools like Zapret and GoodbyeDPI to defeat these blocks at the network level.

Does Russia have its own surveillance system like China?

Yes and no. The SORM system (System for Operative Investigative Measures) has existed since the 1990s and requires Russian ISPs to install equipment enabling targeted traffic interception. Its SORM-3 version includes DPI capabilities. Unlike China's Great Firewall, SORM operates more as a "surveillance + interception on demand" system than a blanket block. Since 2022, however, the trend is toward a harder, more Chinese-style model.

What happens if I am stopped with Tor installed in Russia?

Having Tor Browser installed is not a crime and does not constitute evidence of illegal activity. However, Russian authorities can inspect device contents during checks (especially for journalists, activists, and known political opponents). If browsing history reveals access to media deemed "foreign agents" or the publication of critical content, prosecution may follow — not for Tor itself, but for the content accessed or published.