Tor in Iran in 2026: blocks, pluggable transports, and activist use

Published on April 17, 2026 · About 12 minutes read

Iran occupies a unique place on the global map of the Tor network: between 50,000 and 600,000 daily users depending on the period, systematic blocking by the regime since 2009, a permanent technical battle between Tor Project engineers and those of Iran's National Information Network, and massive political use — especially during major popular mobilizations. The post-Mahsa Amini protests in the autumn of 2022 temporarily made Iran one of the largest Tor-using countries in the world. This article takes stock of the exact state of Tor in Iran in 2026: active blocks, working pluggable transports, alternatives like Psiphon, and the legal and physical risks for users.

History of Tor blocking in Iran

Iran was one of the first countries in the world to systematically block Tor. As early as 2009, following the post-election protests of the "Green Movement", Iranian authorities put in place IP filtering of public Tor relays via the national DPI system. The blocking has been refined year after year, with several major waves: 2011 (after the Arab Spring), 2017–2018, 2019 (a complete internet shutdown lasting 6 days in November), and the major wave from 2022 to 2024.

The National Information Network (NIN), the "halal" internet infrastructure the regime has been building since 2012 as an isolated alternative to the global internet, includes sophisticated DPI capabilities to detect Tor traffic by signature. Public relays are blocked as soon as they appear in the Tor Project's public directory, typically within 24–48 hours.

Unpublished private bridges remain accessible for longer, but the Iranian government has the means to progressively detect and block each identified bridge. It is a permanent race between obtaining new bridges and seeing old ones blocked.

The Mahsa Amini spike (October–November 2022)

On September 16, 2022, Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian Kurdish woman, died in Tehran after being arrested by the morality police for "improper hijab". Her death triggered the largest wave of protests in Iran since 2009. Authorities progressively cut access to Instagram, WhatsApp, Signal, and then large swaths of the Western web.

Tor usage exploded. According to the Tor Project's public metrics:

Before the protests (September 2022): 40,000 to 80,000 daily users
Peak of the protests (October–November 2022): 600,000 daily users, one of the highest figures ever recorded for a single country
December 2022: stabilization around 200,000–300,000 users
2023–2024: gradual return toward 100,000–150,000
2025–2026: oscillation between 50,000 and 200,000 depending on political events

During this period, the Tor Project massively increased the number of available bridges and published emergency guides in Farsi. The organization Access Now and the collective Filterwatch coordinated the distribution of private bridges to local activists.

Active pluggable transports in 2026

Snowflake: the dominant transport

Since late 2022, Snowflake has been the most widely used pluggable transport in Iran. Its architecture — based on WebRTC and ephemeral proxies provided by volunteers worldwide — makes it particularly resistant to blocking: each user connects to a random proxy whose IP can change with every session, rendering blacklists ineffective.

Snowflake does have limitations: speed is variable (from 100 kB/s to several MB/s depending on the proxy), and some Iranian ISPs have DPI rules that intermittently block certain WebRTC negotiations. Experienced users alternate between Snowflake and obfs4 depending on what is getting through.

obfs4: with private bridges

obfs4 still works in Iran but requires freshly obtained private bridges, since the bridges bundled with Tor Browser are blocked within hours of publication. Methods for obtaining bridges:

Email to [email protected] from a Gmail/Riseup/Yahoo address (works with a delay)
Telegram bot @GetBridgesBot — remains accessible from Iran
Site bridges.torproject.org (often blocked, requires VPN or Psiphon to reach)
Community sharing via Signal, Session, or Briar among trusted activists

See our guide on configuring bridges for technical details.

meek-azure: last resort

meek-azure uses the Microsoft Azure CDN, meaning Tor traffic appears as traffic to azure.microsoft.com — very difficult to block without blocking all Azure services (something the Iranian regime is reluctant to do because it would affect business infrastructure). The trade-off is that meek is very slow and costly for the Tor Project (every byte passes through paid Azure infrastructure).

Psiphon: the massive alternative

Psiphon is not Tor but plays a crucial complementary role in Iran. It is an anti-censorship tool developed by Psiphon Inc. (Canada), with American (USAGM, OTF) and European public funding. It combines a multi-protocol VPN (SSH+Obfuscation, MEEK, L2TP) with automatic server rotation.

According to Psiphon's public estimates, Iran has several million daily users — far more than Tor — because Psiphon is easier to use for the general public, free, available on Iranian alternative app stores, and offers acceptable speeds for everyday browsing.

The fundamental difference from Tor: Psiphon protects against censorship but does not offer strong anonymity. Psiphon users can be identified by their Iranian ISP (their IP is known; only the content is hidden). For truly sensitive activities (journalism, organizing protests), Tor remains essential.

Who uses Tor in Iran

The profile of Iranian Tor users is more varied than Western stereotypes suggest.

Journalists and independent media

Independent Iranian journalists (Iran Wire, Zamaneh, Radio Zamaneh) use Tor daily to send articles to their foreign-based newsrooms, receive testimonies from local sources, and access blocked international archives. Many of these outlets have their own .onion version for their Iranian readers.

Students and researchers

A massive, non-political use case: accessing scientific papers, MOOCs (Coursera, edX, blocked in Iran), and the Sci-Hub alternative library for paywalled publications. This motivation accounts for a significant fraction of Iranian Tor traffic without any activist dimension.

LGBT+ community and religious minorities

Minorities (Baha'is, converted Christians, Sunnis in certain regions) and the LGBT+ community use Tor to communicate securely, access psychological resources, support forums, and in some cases assistance services abroad (diaspora associations).

General public and returning expatriates

A significant fraction of ordinary users turn to Tor simply to access YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, or their Gmail accounts, which are intermittently blocked. Iranians who have lived abroad and returned home are more familiar with Tor and use it regularly.

Legal and physical risks

Using Tor in Iran carries real risks that are important to understand.

Legal framework

The 2011 cybercrime law (Qanun-e Jara'im-e Rayaneh'i) provides penalties for using unapproved anonymization services: a fine and up to 3 years in prison. The law is broad but selectively enforced — prosecutors primarily target operators or organizers, not ordinary users.

Arrests for simply using Tor are rare but do occur, especially during periods of political tension. Tor usage typically serves as an aggravating circumstance alongside other charges (spreading critical content, organizing protests, cooperating with foreign media).

Technical correlation risks

The Iranian NIN has traffic correlation capabilities that can identify Tor users based on their connection timing and other signals (session timing, data volume, activity patterns). These capabilities do not enable mass de-anonymization but can be used to target suspected individuals.

For sensitive activities, the Tor Project and NGOs recommend using Tails OS (see our Tails guide), which leaves no local traces and forces all traffic through Tor.

Physical surveillance

Iranian activists under surveillance routinely face device confiscation and interrogations where authorities attempt to extract passwords and encryption keys. Using full-disk encryption (LUKS, FileVault, VeraCrypt) and long passphrases is essential.

Resources and key organizations

Access Now (accessnow.org) — international NGO helping at-risk activists with bridges, opsec advice, and emergency response
Filterwatch (filter.watch) — organization specializing in Iranian censorship, regular publications
Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) — publishes precise technical measurements of Iranian blocking
Iran Wire — independent Iranian media in exile, uses Tor to cover Iran
ASL19 — Canadian-Iranian collective developing anti-censorship tools specifically for Iran

Tor in Iran FAQ

Is Tor legal in Iran?

Not formally. Since the 2011 Iranian cybercrime law, using anonymization services not approved by the regime is punishable by a fine and up to 3 years in prison. In practice, prosecutions for simply using Tor are rare — authorities primarily target operators of dissident services or protest organizers. But the legal threat is real and is experienced as a deterrent by some users.

Which pluggable transport works best in Iran in 2026?

Snowflake has become the dominant choice since late 2022 after withstanding waves of Iranian DPI blocking. obfs4 still works with freshly obtained private bridges but is regularly blocked in major cities. meek-azure is usable as a last resort despite its slowness. Iranian users often alternate between multiple transports as the blocking landscape evolves.

How many Iranians use Tor?

According to official Tor Project metrics, Iran has between 50,000 and 300,000 daily users depending on the period. The historical peak was reached in October–November 2022 during the post-Mahsa Amini protests: roughly 600,000 daily users for several weeks, before a gradual decline. The figures vary sharply with the intensity of political events.

Is Psiphon an alternative to Tor in Iran?

Psiphon is an anti-censorship tool that differs from Tor, with an architecture less focused on anonymity but more oriented toward ease of circumvention. It is massively used in Iran (several million users by its own estimates). Psiphon provides censorship bypass, not strong anonymity — unlike Tor. For everyday browsing, Psiphon is sufficient; for sensitive activities (serious journalism, activism), Tor remains preferable.

Do Iranian activists use Tor Browser directly or through other tools?

Usage patterns vary. Experienced activists use Tor Browser directly with Snowflake or obfs4. Many rely on apps that embed Tor in the background: Signal (which can route via Tor), Briar (Tor-based messaging), Session. OnionShare is used by local journalists to transmit videos and documents to Western media outlets. See our guide on OnionShare.

What are the real risks for an Iranian Tor user?

If you are a student, public employee, or ordinary citizen without dissident activity, the practical risk of prosecution for simply using Tor is low. If you are a local journalist, activist, or member of a targeted ethnic or religious minority, the risk increases considerably — documented cases exist of prosecutions for using Tor combined with publishing critical content. Arrests of Iranian journalists for their writings frequently cite VPN/Tor usage as an aggravating circumstance.